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1. Introduction 
 
 
There can be little doubt that US excise tax rates are state interdependent (Nelson, 2002; 
Rork, 2003; Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano, 2007; Jacobs, Ligthart and Vrijburg, 
2010).  All previous studies, despite obvious differences in their empirical analyses, 
report a positive tax reaction to neighbors’ tax rates, and implicitly or explicitly argue 
that such a response is caused by strategic tax competition attributable to cross-border 
shopping, smuggling or both. In this paper we focus on taxes on cigarettes and gasoline 
in the US and show that tax interdependence is due solely to tax mimicking.  
 
Brueckner (2003) describes two sources of strategic interaction among governments, 
captured in the resource-flow and spillover models respectively. The former stresses the 
role of tax base mobility, while the latter points to the possibility of information spilling 
over among interested voters in different jurisdictions (Salmon, 1987). Unfortunately, it 
is difficult in practice to disentangle one source from the other, as both models make the 
same empirical prediction, namely that tax rates should be interdependent among sub-
central governments. In the case of tax competition, tax base mobility is required; in the 
case of yardstick competition, it is assumed that voters assess the relative performance 
of their respective governments and compare it with that of comparable governments 
when deciding who to cast their vote for. Thus, for this accountability mechanism to 
work, fiscal information must be readily available to voters.  
 
In order to disentangle tax competition from that of yardstick, we proceed as Besley and 
Case (1995a). We distinguish those states run by a governor who is ineligible to run for 
reelection (because of a term limit) from all other states. We test their differential 
reaction for cigarette and gasoline taxes for a panel dataset running from 1975 to 2006. 
We find that only those governors who are not lame ducks set their tax rates by taking 
into account the rates levied by comparable jurisdictions - which, in keeping with the 
literature (see, for example, Besley and Case, 1995a), we shall from this point on 
identify as the geographically contiguous states - while the other governors set taxes 
independently of the behavior of their neighbors. Specifically, in the case of governors 
not approaching the end of their tenure, a one-cent increase in the real tax rate of their 
neighbors implies a contemporaneous tax increase of 0.13c and 0.21c for gasoline and 
cigarettes, respectively; moreover, in the long run a one-cent increase will be perfectly 
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matched in the case of cigarettes, while in the case of gasoline it will rise to 0.72c. 
Therefore, in spite of a fairly well-documented tax base mobility, it does not seem to be 
the cause of the average tax interdependence among US states in the case of excise 
taxation. Rather, states tend to mimic each other because of their reelection concerns 
regarding the role of excise taxation. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a summary 
of the empirical literature on tax interdependence, focusing on yardstick competition 
and on the analyses carried out for US excise taxation. In section three, we present the 
empirical analysis and discuss the results. Finally, we conclude. 
 
2. Previous literature 
 
Salmon (1987) was the first author to recognize that comparative performance 
constituted a potential source of fiscal interdependence among sub-national 
governments. In his words, “each government has an incentive to do better than 
governments in other jurisdictions in terms of levels and qualities of services, of levels 
of taxes or of more general economic and social indicators” (p. 32). Subsequently, 
Besley and Case (1995a) developed a sophisticated information externality model 
among jurisdictions. The model implies that voters draw on relevant information from 
comparable jurisdictions in order to infer fiscal information that is fundamental in 
helping them make their next voting decision. Should this indeed be the case, then 
politicians need to be well aware of what their comparable jurisdictions are doing if they 
wish to ensure their own reelection for a further term.  
 
Besley and Case (1995a) tested this hypothesis by comparing the tax-setting decisions 
of those governors that could be reelected with the rates chosen by those who could not. 
They tested it both for state income-tax liability and for an amalgam of state taxes 
(sales, income and corporate income), and in both cases found that lame duck governors 
did not make tax changes that were dependent on their neighbors’ rates, which was very 
much in contrast with the performance of the rest of the state governors. If tax 
competition were the cause of tax interdependence, then the reaction should have been 
independent of whether governors could be held accountable (no term limit) or not 
(binding term limit). For this reason, the authors conclude that the tax interdependence 
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found was due only to yardstick competition. In more recent studies, this source of tax 
interdependence has also been found by Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003), Solé-
Ollé (2003), and Allers and Elhorst (2005). All of which were undertaken with local 
governments in various countries with a primary focus on property taxation. 
 
In the case of excise taxation, there is considerable empirical evidence of tax 
interdependence for the US case. However, as a result no doubt of the extensive 
anecdotic evidence that cross-border shopping, and even smuggling, are very important 
in certain areas, authors have tended not to devote much time in attempting to 
disentangle the most likely source of this interdependence.  
 
Rork (2003) reported a horizontal reaction of 0.636 and 0.6 cents for cigarette and 
gasoline, respectively. He measured each tax in (real) cents, and attributed all the 
reaction to tax base mobility. However, if state taxes are serially correlated (which is the 
case for excise taxes, since statutory tax rates do not often vary over time) and the 
empirical specification fails to take this into full account, the estimates might be 
upwardly biased. In order to tackle this problem, Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano 
(2007), and Jacobs, Ligthart and Vrijburg (2010) include the lagged endogenous 
variable with the result that the estimate of the horizontal reaction is considerably lower. 
The former obtain a reaction of 0.277 and 0.191 (though, statistically insignificant) for 
cigarette and gasoline taxation, respectively. Jacobs, Ligthart and Vrijburg (2010) 
define the tax rate variable as an “average effective tax rate”, which is an average of the 
state sales tax and specific tax rates. In their case, and although not fully comparable 
with the two previous results, the reaction they estimate is around 0.4. Yet, in both 
analyses the presence of the lagged endogenous variable allows them to obtain a long-
run reaction, which is almost equal to 1. 
 
While Jacobs, Ligthart and Vrijburg (2010) remain silent about the source of tax 
interdependence, Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2007) suggest that their results 
point to tax competition as being the most likely source, since in their spatial lag model 
the average of all the rest of state taxes is not statistically significant while the tax 
average constructed using neighbor weights works better. However, note that their 
conclusions might be somewhat hastily drawn, as information externalities are usually 
thought to flow more easily between neighboring jurisdictions (Salmon, 1987; Besley 
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and Case, 1995a).  
 
In contrast with these previous studies, and now that the presence of tax 
interdependence is well documented, we aim at identifying the source of this 
interdependence. Our results are clear-cut and robust: tax interdependence in excise 
taxation is due solely to yardstick competition.  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1. Empirical framework 
 
To test for the source of horizontal tax interaction in the US, we estimate the tax-
reaction function by relating one state tax to the average tax of its neighboring states for 
the period 1975-2006. We then repeat this procedure for gasoline and cigarette taxes 
transformed into real terms (using the federal CPI). 
 
In order to estimate the potentially different reaction of states depending on whether 
their governor can or cannot stand for reelection, we estimate the following equation for 
each case:  
 
             jstjstjst
si
jstsi
i
jstsitsjst tXtwtwt εμβϕϕφα ++++++= −
≠
− ∑∑ 11'          [1]  
 
where jstt  is the real tax rate on commodity j for state s in year t; sα is a state fixed 
effect; tφ  is a year effect; ∑
≠ si
jstsitw  is the average real tax rate for commodity j of the 
neighboring states of state s in year t, where siw are identical exogenous weights, 
normalized such that ∑
≠
=
si
si 1ω , which account for the relative interdependence relation 
between s and the rest of the i-states; jstX is a vector of state-specific time-varying 
regressors; while jstε  is a mean zero, normally distributed random error. As long as the 
estimate of ϕϕ +'  is different from zero for the sample where the governor is not a lame 
duck and equal to zero for the sample where the governor is a lame duck, we can 
confirm that the interaction is solely the result of yardstick competition. If ϕ  were to be 
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significant in both samples, then tax competition would be operative, but if yardstick 
competition were also present , we would expect a lower estimate for lame duck 
governors. 
 
In Besley and Case (1995a), but also in Case (1993), “… the empirical specification 
[will] use changes in taxes as the main tax-setting decision. Such changes are most 
likely to represent responses to shocks about which there is asymmetric information” (p. 
32). While tax levels have been used elsewhere (e.g., Solé-Ollé, 2003; and Allers and 
Elhorst, 2005), here we opt for a more parsimonious empirical specification. We include 
the lagged endogenous variable and a lag of the neighbors’ tax in a model that 
constitutes a general version of Besley and Case’s (1995a) empirical specification. As 
long as the estimate of the lagged endogenous variable is equal to 1, and the (absolute 
value of the) estimate of the contemporaneous and lagged neighbors’ tax rate is equal, 
our model collapses into theirs. Thus, a priori our model does permit both types of 
reaction: both in levels and changes. 
 
In order to isolate the independent impact of the average of the neighboring states’ tax, 
we include other variables that might affect the state tax rate and that must be taken into 
account in order to avoid biased estimates. These variables are included in the 
vector jstX . Specifically, state taxation may be influenced by the economic and 
demographic environment. As is usual in the literature, this is controlled for by the 
following variables: population (and its square), per-capita income (and its square), 
unemployment rate, proportion of population over 65 and proportion of population 
between 5 and 17. We also take federal fiscal instruments into account, as these may 
differ from state to state and might condition the setting of state tax rates. Thus, we 
include federal grants-in-aid in relation to total population and the federal income tax 
collected in each state, normalized by the adjusted gross income. The political affiliation 
of the state government may also affect the tax rate level. We build dummies for the 
governors' party affiliation (Democrat or Republican) and variables to account for the 
percentage representation of the political parties (Democrat or Republican) in the House 
and in the Senate. 
 
Certain invariable state characteristics are likely to affect its tax system, such as climate 
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or geography, among others. We take these characteristics into account by including a 
dichotomous variable for each state. Changes in the macroeconomic situation may also 
affect a state’s fiscal policies, and so we include a set of time effects.  
 
The mean US neighboring tax rate,∑
≠ si
jstsitw , is endogenous because it can be 
simultaneously influenced by the tax rate that we are estimating. Then, if this was a 
structural model, a simple OLS estimation of [1] would suffer from endogeneity bias: 
the error term εjst would be correlated with the error terms of the other simultaneous 
equations in the system. In order to overcome the simultaneity bias, we use the two-
stage least-squares method: first, we estimate the reduced forms of the endogenous 
variables, and then we substitute their fitted values into [1]. The residuals of this last 
equation are corrected using the actual values of the endogenous variables. We 
instrument the mean US neighboring tax rate with the US neighboring variables POPst, 
CHILDst, AGEDst, UNEMPst,  DEMSENst, DEMHOUst. Consequently, we have six 
instruments in total. Hence Equation [1], which has one endogenous variable, can be 
identified.1 
 
3. 2. Data 
 
3.2.1 Nominal tax rates 
Taxes on gasoline and cigarettes vary considerably across states. In 1990, for example, 
the tax per pack of cigarettes ranged from 2 cents in North Carolina to 40 cents in 
Connecticut. In the same year, the tax per gallon of gasoline ranged from 7.5 cents in 
Georgia to 22 cents in Connecticut and Washington. Thus, there is significant cross-
sectional variation.  
 
Individual state taxes on cigarettes also vary over time. For example, in North Carolina 
the tax rate varied between 2 and 5 cents in 1992, but reached 30 cents in 2005 and 35 
in 2006. Connecticut shows even more variation, levying a tax of 21 cents up to 1983, 
before increasing the rate to 26 cents in 1984, then raising it again to 40 in 1989, 45 in 
                                                 
1 The lag of the dependent variable biases all the estimated coefficients of the regression for 
finite-T samples. However, in our case, the Nickell (1981) bias should not be a significant 
problem, due to the fact that our panel runs over 32 years. Therefore, we do not instrument the 
lagged endogenous variable. 
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1992, 47 in 1994, 50 in 1995, 111 in 2002 and finally 151 cents in 2003. Likewise, 
individual state taxes on gasoline show considerable variation over time. While Georgia 
maintained the same tax (7.5 cents) throughout the period studied here, the rate varied 
markedly in Connecticut and Washington. Connecticut increased its tax rate from 10 to 
11 cents per gallon in 1976, to 14 in 1983 and then to 38 in 1997. This was followed by 
a reduction to 36 cents in 1998, 32 in 1999 and, finally, to 25 in 2002. Washington 
levied 9 cents till 1976, which rose gradually to 18 in 1984, 22 in 1990 and 23 in 1991. 
The tax was then increased to 28 in 2004, 31 in 2005 and, finally, 34 in 2006.   
 
3.2.2 Description of the term limit variable 
This is a dichotomous variable, but one that varies considerably by state and year in our 
sample. There are states in which there is no term limit on the governor’s election; 
while in others there is a one-term limit (Virginia), a two-term limit, or a three-term 
limit (Utah). Additionally, some states in our sample have changed their legislation 
from a no-term limit to a two-term limit or from a one-term limit to a two-term limit. 
Besley and Case (1995b) and List and Sturm (2006) have exploited this variation 
between states and over time in order to assess the potentially different performance of 
lame duck governors. 
 
3.2.3 The other variables  
The rest of the right-hand-side variables in [1], with their definitions, averages and 
standard deviations are reported in Table 1.  
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
We include a set of time-varying variables that characterize the states’ economic and 
demographic situation: the state population (POP), per capita state income (INC), the 
state unemployment rate (UNEMP), the proportion of individuals in the state who are 
aged between 5 and 17 (CHILD), and the proportion who are over 65 (AGED). The 
states’ political environment can also affect fiscal outcomes. Therefore, we use a 
dummy variable that equals one if the governor is a Democrat (DEMGOV). We also 
account for the proportion of Democrats in the state Senate and in the House of 
Representatives (DEMSEN and DEMHOU, respectively). The cigarette and gasoline 
industries might affect the state tax rate by lobbying for the rates of their respective 
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commodities (Dixit, 1996). Therefore, in order to control for the influence of lobbies, 
we include TOBINC (tobacco production per dollar of state income) and GASINC 
(gasoline production per dollar of state income). The federal fiscal policy, other than 
commodity tax rates, may also affect state commodity tax rates. Thus, we control for 
per capita federal grants to the states (GRANTS), and the average federal income in the 
state (INCTAX), defined as the ratio of the state’s federal income tax liability to its 
adjusted gross income.  
 
3.3. Empirical results 
 
In Table 2, we present our results for taxes on gasoline. In column (1), we estimate a 
restricted model, as it only includes the contemporaneous value of the neighbors’ tax 
variable. The short-run reaction is 0.226, while the long-run reaction is 1.121 (i.e., 
0.2263/(1-0.7982)). In column (2), we include a lag of the neighbors’ tax variable, 
which is statistically significant. The short-run reaction is now slightly lower, 0.151 
(i.e., 0.6605-0.5090), while the long-run reaction is 0.796. In Table 3, we obtain similar 
results for taxes on cigarettes. When we estimate the most flexible model (lagged 
endogenous variable and lagged tax competitors’ variable), the short- and long-run 
reactions (see again column (2)) are 0.175 and 1.167, respectively. Therefore, in both 
cases, in line with results published elsewhere in the literature, we find positive tax 
interdependence, albeit somewhat higher in the case of cigarettes. However, recall, we 
are interested in identifying the source of this interdependence. 
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
That is why, going back to gasoline, in Table 2, we distinguish those states whose 
governor can run for reelection (column (3)) from those where there is a binding term 
limit (column (4)). In this latter case, it is clear that the reaction is not statistically 
significant, while in the case where the governor can run for reelection the short-run 
reaction is 0.134 and the long-run reaction is 0.718. Therefore, as in Besley and Case 
(1995a), the empirical evidence points to yardstick competition. Similarly, in Table 3, 
we obtain the same qualitative results: lame duck governors do not react to neighboring 
cigarette tax rates. In contrast (column (3)), the rest of the state governors, in the short 
run, faced by a 1-cent increase in their neighbor’s cigarette tax rates, raise their tax rates 
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by 0.21c, while in the long-run the increase can be as high as 1.488 (which cannot be 
rejected as it is not equal to 1). 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
The long-run reaction, especially in the case of cigarette taxation, is quite high. For this 
reason, in Table 4, we present a robustness check including lags of the neighbors’ tax 
rates rather than the lagged dependent variable.2 The first three columns of Table 4 refer 
to gasoline, while the rest refer to cigarettes. Note that in columns (1) and (4), we do not 
distinguish according to whether a term limit is at work or not. However, in columns (3) 
and (6) we do show the results for the lame duck governors, but the reaction is still 
statistically insignificant. When the state governor is eligible to run for reelection 
(column (2)), the long-run reaction in the case of gasoline is equal to 0.695, while in the 
case of cigarettes (column (5)) the reaction is equal to 0.976. Hence, the qualitative 
results do not change, but now the long-run reactions are slightly lower.  
 
[TABLE 4] 
 
Finally, in the next two tables, we deflate the nominal statutory tax rates by using a state 
price index.3 Since a general price index disaggregated by states is not available for the 
US, we use the Housing Price Index (HPI), which is readily available for our entire time 
span.4 In Table 5 we present the results for gasoline and in Table 6 we do the same for 
cigarette taxation. The structure of both tables is identical to that of Tables 2 and 3, 
respectively. First, when not distinguishing between states according to the presence or 
otherwise of a term limit, we still obtain positive reactions, although their values are 
lower. Second, in the case of both cigarette and gasoline taxation rates, states only react 
                                                 
2 Chirinko and Wilson (2009) show that the standard lagged dependent variable model (i.e., the 
one we use) is nested within a more general dynamic model that does not include the lagged 
dependent variable but an infinite number of time lags of the independent variables. Note that 
we have estimated a restricted version of that more general model as we only include four lags 
of the neighbors’ tax rates and none for the remaining exogenous variables. 
 
3  Lockwood and Migali (2008) use a country-retail price index to deflate statutory tax rates 
when they estimate tax interdependence in excise taxes for the EU. 
 
4 In spite of the volatility of the housing market, Esteller and Rizzo (2009) show that this index 
performs quite well in estimating the deflated reaction functions for cigarettes and gasoline in 
the US. 
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when their governor can run for reelection. Hence, the qualitative results are also robust 
to the deflator used to transform nominal tax rates in real terms. In the case of gasoline, 
the reaction is 0.061 and 0.312 in the short- and long-run, respectively; while in the case 
of cigarettes, these reactions are equal to 0.281 and 1.063 (which cannot be rejected as it 
is not equal to 1).  
 
[TABLE 5] 
[TABLE 6] 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
 
We explore the causes of the state interdependence of cigarette and gasoline taxation in 
the US, and provide empirical evidence that only those states whose governor can run 
for reelection react to their neighbors’ tax rates. This paper contributes to the literature 
on US excise taxation by showing that tax rates are interdependent because incumbent 
governors set their taxes in accordance with the rates levied by their neighbors so as to 
ensure their reelection. Our results complement those reported by Besley and Case 
(1995a), who found empirical evidence of yardstick competition in the case of income 
tax rates in the US.  
 
This result is quite robust to different specifications. Interestingly, the reaction when 
governors are not lame ducks is much higher in the case of cigarettes. Indeed in this 
case we cannot even reject the possibility that in the long run tax rates are perfectly 
matched between neighboring jurisdictions. We leave the explanation of this differential 
behavior between gasoline and cigarette taxation for further research. 
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Data Appendix 
 
• tst US cigarette tax rate for state s in year t, divided by the CPI or the HPI. These 
rates are taken from www.OTPR.org: cigarette tax rates are expressed in US 
dollars per pack of 20 cigarettes and gasoline tax rates are expressed in US 
dollars per gallon of gasoline. 
 
Endogenous variables 
 
• ∑
≠ si
stsitw  is the mean of the states tax rates, divided by the CPI or HPI, of the 
states bordering state s in year t.  
 
Demographic and economic variables 
 
• POPst is the number of persons in state s in year t. This figure is taken from 
www.census.gov. 
• CHILDst  is the ratio of individuals aged 5-17 years to the total population of 
state s  in year t, taken from www.census.gov for the USA. 
• AGEDst  is the ratio of individuals of over 65 years of age to the total population 
of state s in year t, taken from www.census.gov for the USA. 
• UNEMPst is the unemployment rate for state s in year t, taken from 
www.stats.bls.gov. 
• INCst  is the per-capita income for state s in year t divided by the CPI or HPI. 
Income data were taken from http://www.bea.doc.gov. 
• GRANTst is the per-capita federal grant-in-aid for state s in year t. It is obtained 
from "Federal Expenditures by State" which is part of the Consolidated Federal 
Funds Reports program from US Census Bureau. 
• DEMGOVst dummy=1 if the governor of the state is a Democratic, taken from 
the Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
• TERMLIMITst dummy=1 if the governor cannot run for reelection, taken from 
the Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
• DEMSENst proportion of state Senate that is Democratic, taken from the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
• DEMHOUst proportion of state House that is Democratic, taken from the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
• CPIt (Consumer Price Index) was taken from the Statistical Abstracts of the 
United States (2000). 
• HPIst (House Price Index) was taken from http://www.ofheo.gov, the website of 
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight in the USA. 
• TOBINCst annual tobacco production (thousand of pounds); from 
http://www.nass.usda.gov, the website of the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service in the USA. 
• GASINCst is the daily gasoline production (thousand barrels per day) per dollar 
of state income in real terms with CPI or HPI; from http://www.eia.doe.gov, the 
website of the Energy Information Administration in the USA. 
• INCTAXst federal income tax divided by adjusted gross income. Federal income 
tax and adjusted gross income are from the http://www.irs.gov, the website of 
the Internal Revenue Service, a Department of the Treasury in the USA. 
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Table 1: 'Summary statistics*
Variable Obs Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max
tg*10 (state unit gasoline tax, cents in real terms with CPI) 1504 121.487 27.700 37.202 236.760
Tg*10 (federal unit gasoline tax cents in real terms with CPI) 1504 89.653 23.241 41.451 127.336
tc*10 (state unit cigarette tax, cents in real terms with CPI) 1504 216.776 164.998 13.587 1302.276
Tc*10 (federal unita cigarette tax cents in real terms with CPI) 1504 151.423 33.508 82.902 216.787
tg*10 (state unit gasoline tax, cents in real terms with HPI) 1504 97.673 31.177 18.201 201.350
Tg*10 (federal unit gasoline tax cents in real terms with HPI) 1504 74.898 25.379 31.025 147.409
tc*10 (state unit cigarette tax, cents in real terms with HPI) 1504 160.183 89.162 7.990 649.710
Tc*10 (federal unita cigarette tax cents in real terms with HPI) 1504 119.973 33.349 50.480 235.863
Termlimit 1504 0.261 0.439 0 1
GDP (real national gross domestic product , billion of dolllars in real terms with CPI) 1504 45.662 10.138 30.452 65.707
GDP (real national gross domestic product , billion of dolllars in real terms with HPI) 1504 36.121 9.925 15.484 66.492
FED UNEMP (federal unemployment rate) 1504 6.284 1.410 4 9.7
DEF (federal deficit over national gross domestic product) 1504 0.026 0.020 -0.027 0.059
POP(state population*10-6) 1504 5.314 5.577 0.382 36.250
INC (state income per capita*10-3 in real terms with CPI) 1504 140.754 28.405 78.134 251.798
INC (state income per capita*10-3 in real terms with HPI) 1504 110.134 22.616 58.685 197.910
UNEMP (state unemployment rate) 1504 5.984 2.018 2.3 17.4
CHILD (proportion of population between 5 and 17) 1504 0.196 0.021 0.155 0.268
AGED (proportion of population over 65) 1504 0.122 0.019 0.073 0.185
TOBINC (tobacco production per dollar of state income in real terms with CPI) 1504 257.890 925.431 0 10225.09
TOBINC (tobacco production per dollar of state income in real terms with HPI) 1504 323.134 1155.657 0 13393.34
GASINC (daily gasoline production per dollar of state income in real terms with CPI) 1504 0.818 2.703 0.000 31.343
GASINC (daily gasoline production per dollar of state income in real terms with HPI) 1504 0.950 3.211 0.000 35.934
GRANTS (federal grants per capita in dollars*10-8 in real terms with CPI) 1504 563*10-8 226*10-8 231*10-8 2740*10-8
GRANTS (federal grants per capita in dollars*10-8 in real terms with HPI) 1504 444*10-8 199*10-8 151*10-8 2210*10-8
INCTAX (federal income tax divided by adjusted gross income) 1504 0.137 0.016 0.092 0.193
DEMGOV (=1 if the governor is a Democrat) 1504 0.537 0.499 0 1
DEMSEN (proportion of state Senate that is Democratic) 1504 0.577 0.186 0.086 1
DEMHOU (proportion of state House that is Democratic) 1504 0.574 0.179 0.129 1
*Figures are based on annual data for continental US states for the year 1975 to 2006, inclusive. All the monetary variables are espressed in real terms, divideded by
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1982-84 taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States or the Housing Price Index (HPI) 1980 taken from the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (http://www.ofheo.gov). We do not include non continental states (Hawaii, District of Columbia and Alaska) and Nebraska,
whose Legislature is unicameral and non-partisan.
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Table 2: Gasoline tax rates (1975-2006) deflated with CPI.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wstgastax 0.2263 0.6605 0.7159 -0.4892
(3.04)*** (2.58)** (2.95)*** (0.72)
L1Wstgastax -0.5090 -0.5815 0.4782
(2.31)** (2.72)*** (0.86)
L1stgastax 0.7982 0.8096 0.8128 0.7616
(38.61)*** (40.48)*** (35.17)*** (20.68)***
population 0.6264 0.2348 0.5373 -2.6793
(0.90) (0.34) (0.58) (1.60)
popsq 0.0005 0.0059 0.0021 0.0525
(0.04) (0.48) (0.14) (1.43)
stinc 0.2592 0.1631 0.0842 -0.5962
(1.13) (0.77) (0.37) (0.87)
stincsq -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0011
(0.93) (0.77) (0.18) (0.62)
stunemp 0.5118 0.2509 0.0637 0.0724
(1.47) (0.61) (0.14) (0.10)
child -89.6061 -38.0679 -71.1448 74.0006
(1.67)* (0.64) (1.02) (0.63)
aged 21.4262 19.8632 -19.4290 20.3475
(0.36) (0.32) (0.24) (0.17)
tobinc -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0017 -0.0007
(1.54) (1.35) (1.86)* (0.60)
gasinc -0.0701 -0.1713 -0.1681 0.0581
(0.43) (1.08) (0.76) (0.19)
grants*10-5 -0.3862 0.8938 1.1932 -6.1235
(0.20) (0.47) (0.57) (0.76)
fedinctax -170.8184 -109.6867 -186.3936 -35.0803
(2.39)** (1.50) (2.14)** (0.31)
demgov -0.1703 -0.4071 -0.5509 1.1185
(0.32) (0.75) (0.88) (0.88)
demsen 3.7583 3.3225 1.9829 2.9774
(0.88) (0.81) (0.43) (0.39)
demhou 1.4446 3.9623 7.4892 -8.7669
(0.30) (0.88) (1.40) (0.94)
Constant -4.7803 -1.3854 21.7223 95.2742
(0.15) (0.04) (0.59) (1.00)
Observations 1457 1457 1078 379
r-squared 0.8978 0.8929 0.8994 0.8991
overid test 0.8690 0.9353 0.7595 0.1388
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3: Cigarettes tax rates (1975-2006), deflated with CPI.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wstcigtax 0.1956 1.0221 1.5826 -0.3812
(1.92)* (1.99)** (2.30)** (0.76)
L1Wstcigtax -0.8471 -1.3721 0.3019
(1.75)* (2.07)** (0.67)
L1stcigtax 0.8380 0.8501 0.8585 0.7556
(23.48)*** (23.33)*** (18.15)*** (10.71)***
population 11.9320 16.8405 31.9521 -24.4485
(1.27) (1.56) (2.02)** (1.31)
popsq -0.2452 -0.3405 -0.4904 0.4817
(1.45) (1.63) (1.87)* (0.75)
stinc -0.4325 -0.0811 0.6088 -5.3113
(0.30) (0.05) (0.31) (2.29)**
stincsq 0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0034 0.0161
(0.23) (0.11) (0.66) (2.38)**
stunemp 0.5231 -0.5121 -2.4319 2.3175
(0.41) (0.33) (1.03) (0.97)
child -253.9931 -101.1222 -11.5740 -528.9913
(0.90) (0.30) (0.02) (0.75)
aged -41.0045 -127.2273 -140.7839 -165.4124
(0.09) (0.25) (0.18) (0.16)
tobinc 0.0038 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0007
(1.08) (0.14) (0.09) (0.15)
gasinc -1.4518 -1.1929 1.4253 1.9165
(0.85) (0.62) (0.47) (0.71)
grants*10-5 0.3871 -25.030 -33.818 -82.650
(0.02) (0.91) (0.85) (0.92)
fedinctax 530.6175 141.9638 -228.4589 15.7822
(1.11) (0.26) (0.27) (0.03)
demgov 5.5764 4.2349 6.8803 2.0728
(1.67)* (1.15) (1.34) (0.37)
demsen 17.3229 25.4090 58.3829 -25.6972
(0.89) (1.08) (1.62) (0.82)
demhou 49.7351 39.4400 23.7984 62.0460
(1.49) (1.14) (0.53) (1.32)
Constant -64.7302 -58.2349 -141.0333 763.6964
(0.35) (0.30) (0.49) (1.99)**
Observations 1457 1457 1078 379
r-squared 0.8920 0.8649 0.8294 0.8969
overid test 0.3177 0.7709 0.9655 0.5681
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
stgastax stgastax stgastax stcigtax stcigtax stcigtax
Wstgastax 2.2230 1.9946 0.1117
(4.78)*** (4.45)*** (0.13)
L1Wstgastax -1.7670 -1.6271 0.1179
(4.07)*** (3.90)*** (0.18)
L2Wstgastax 0.3145 0.3107 0.0770
(1.83)* (1.76)* (0.37)
L3Wstgastax 0.0155 0.0127 0.0312
(0.10) (0.08) (0.18)
L4Wstgastax -0.0394 0.0041 -0.1122
(0.36) (0.03) (0.89)
Wstcigtax 3.4175 3.4105 -0.5098
(3.58)*** (3.12)*** (0.53)
L1Wstcigtax -3.0439 -3.1533 0.6002
(3.07)*** (2.69)*** (0.75)
L2Wstcigtax 0.6395 0.7056 -0.0271
(1.44) (1.40) (0.08)
L3Wstcigtax 0.1062 0.1737 -0.2094
(0.25) (0.35) (0.60)
L4Wstcigtax -0.2250 -0.1603 0.4323
(0.56) (0.35) (0.98)
population -3.5609 -4.5264 -11.5089 54.6459 88.8506 -91.5786
(1.77)* (2.01)** (3.28)*** (2.29)** (3.40)*** (2.78)***
popsq 0.0684 0.0810 0.1451 -1.0321 -1.3439 1.8808
(1.99)** (2.32)** (2.14)** (2.05)** (2.67)*** (1.69)*
stinc -0.0222 -0.4063 -1.5709 -2.4330 -3.1301 -4.3297
(0.04) (0.75) (1.26) (0.66) (0.76) (1.32)
stincsq -0.0004 0.0008 0.0027 0.0041 0.0042 0.0206
(0.30) (0.62) (0.84) (0.41) (0.39) (2.62)***
stunemp -0.2071 0.8783 -3.1884 -6.3376 -11.3885 13.4324
(0.27) (0.99) (2.61)*** (1.61) (2.45)** (3.09)***
child 47.1277 -186.7695 661.6817 340.2311 260.1192 797.9384
(0.45) (1.68)* (2.62)*** (0.41) (0.26) (0.52)
aged 9.8928 60.8351 -548.0477 -2,167.3954 -1,995.4138 -474.4296
(0.07) (0.37) (2.15)** (1.68)* (1.22) (0.32)
tobinc -0.0027 -0.0067 -0.0023 -0.0029 0.0042 0.0003
(1.50) (3.63)*** (1.17) (0.30) (0.25) (0.03)
gasinc -2.8431 -3.2104 0.4192 -0.2688 8.1079 8.4387
(4.59)*** (4.31)*** (0.42) (0.05) (1.33) (1.26)
grants*10-5 8.3257 1.5168 35.7186 -45.104 -43.101 -36.251
(1.35) (0.29) (2.42)** (0.65) (0.60) (0.28)
fedinctax 39.2175 49.4968 -263.1867 -96.9574 -667.1647 -602.6016
(0.26) (0.29) (1.22) (0.08) (0.41) (0.66)
demgov 0.6259 -0.2608 7.1244 15.0176 20.2883 5.4174
(0.57) (0.21) (3.36)*** (1.80)* (2.06)** (0.64)
demsen 9.1907 -4.8656 9.6509 100.2689 225.3918 -137.5173
(1.16) (0.58) (0.62) (1.98)** (3.45)*** (1.96)*
demhou 11.9273 30.0915 -47.3397 39.6108 1.3354 60.6686
(1.37) (3.01)*** (2.97)*** (0.49) (0.01) (0.83)
Constant 33.6352 100.8681 304.3155 264.0698 236.2100 828.3861
(0.47) (1.33) (1.68)* (0.56) (0.43) (1.21)
Observations 1316 980 336 1316 980 336
r-squared 0.6217 0.6658 0.8125 0.4382 0.4653 0.8294
overid test 0.0183 0.0054 0.0209 0.9197 0.9327 0.4304
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Gasoline and cigarette taxes (1975-2006). Specification with neighbor's lags.
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Table 5: Gasoline tax rates (1975-2006), deflated with HPI.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
stgastax stgastax stgastax stgastax
Wstgastax 0.1191 0.2663 0.2858 0.0040
(2.99)*** (2.02)** (2.18)** (0.02)
L1Wstgastax -0.1958 -0.2247 0.0958
(1.62) (1.87)* (0.41)
L1stgastax 0.7957 0.8019 0.8043 0.7549
(37.64)*** (39.93)*** (33.31)*** (20.06)***
vstate_index -75.1346 -69.9104 -77.6302 -57.1761
(13.05)*** (11.21)*** (11.26)*** (4.31)***
population -0.1962 -0.2503 -0.1024 -2.9481
(0.33) (0.42) (0.14) (2.31)**
popsq 0.0148 0.0177 0.0142 0.0774
(1.41) (1.66)* (1.08) (2.37)**
stinc 0.0873 0.1275 0.1133 0.1587
(0.84) (1.26) (0.96) (0.68)
stincsq -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000
(0.22) (0.37) (0.34) (0.05)
stunemp 0.6236 0.4361 0.2397 0.3833
(2.05)** (1.20) (0.68) (0.48)
child 11.9934 47.5984 49.5008 164.0160
(0.25) (1.06) (0.95) (1.60)
aged 122.6758 116.6796 132.7148 93.6154
(2.48)** (2.32)** (2.11)** (0.96)
tobinc -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0009 0.0006
(0.72) (0.74) (1.74)* (0.71)
gasinc -0.2095 -0.2115 -0.2999 0.2759
(1.58) (1.61) (1.76)* (1.32)
grants*10-5 -3.1788 -2.6053 -2.9121 -1.4659
(1.31) (1.13) (1.10) (0.18)
fedinctax -91.4143 -97.5531 -126.7453 -157.4796
(1.98)** (2.13)** (2.26)** (1.85)*
demgov -0.1048 -0.1546 -0.2709 0.4494
(0.23) (0.34) (0.51) (0.49)
demsen 1.6995 1.6060 0.0349 -0.0235
(0.49) (0.47) (0.01) (0.00)
demhou 1.6562 2.9177 8.6570 -13.2420
(0.43) (0.78) (1.90)* (1.65)*
Constant -9.6600 -15.4833 -15.2923 -4.2015
(0.66) (1.09) (0.87) (0.17)
Observations 1457 1457 1078 379
r-squared 0.9428 0.9429 0.9498 0.9309
overid test 0.9188 0.6024 0.8868 0.0239
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 6: Cigarettes tax rates (1975-2006), deflated with HPI.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
stcigtax stcigtax stcigtax stcigtax
Wstcigtax 0.2223 0.5187 0.6602 -0.3544
(3.02)*** (1.94)* (2.08)** (1.33)
L1Wstcigtax -0.2919 -0.3791 0.2332
(1.19) (1.34) (0.90)
L1stcigtax 0.7480 0.7453 0.7355 0.6949
(22.17)*** (21.03)*** (16.82)*** (9.21)***
vstate_index -139.9759 -124.0335 -1245153 -154.8213
(7.51)*** (5.59)*** (4.86)*** (3.72)***
population 4.3958 5.1092 102520 -15.2780
(0.85) (0.97) (1.36) (1.48)
popsq -0.0871 -0.1017 -0.1614 0.2415
(0.94) (1.05) (1.33) (0.80)
stinc 0.3033 0.1885 0.1452 1.0658
(0.70) (0.40) (0.24) (0.88)
stincsq -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0002
(0.28) (0.03) (0.21) (0.04)
stunemp -0.0556 -0.5221 -13663 1.5978
(0.06) (0.51) (1.02) (0.93)
child -15.1384 48.0397 877648 495.5269
(0.08) (0.23) (0.37) (1.14)
aged 409.9295 381.1820 5741267 557.3033
(1.40) (1.31) (1.55) (1.02)
tobinc 0.0022 0.0011 0.0026 0.0029
(1.10) (0.54) (0.84) (1.18)
gasinc -1.4257 -1.3228 -15077 1.5034
(1.74)* (1.49) (1.39) (1.03)
grants*10-5 -15.551 -21.316 -15.839 -133.23
(0.98) (1.23) (0.75) (2.76)***
fedinctax 283.8641 169.8095 789934 -443.3065
(1.23) (0.69) (0.23) (0.95)
demgov 3.9744 3.6983 54798 0.5232
(1.79)* (1.64) (1.98)** (0.14)
demsen 9.3365 12.8240 300298 -25.9117
(0.68) (0.89) (1.54) (1.18)
demhou 19.5567 18.2040 0.9106 13.8836
(0.89) (0.86) (0.03) (0.41)
Constant -115.3866 -106.4258 -1463201 28.8538
(1.67)* (1.49) (1.63) (0.20)
Observations 1457 1457 1078 379
r-squared 0.8336 0.8242 0.8061 0.8831
overid test 0.2218 0.2390 0.3069 0.2281
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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